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THE ‘COVID-19’ EXECUTIVE ORDER GENERALLY TOLLING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT EXTEND THE TIME FOR FILING A PETITION TO VALIDATE A DESIGNATING PETITION, WHICH IS GOVERNED BY ANOTHER ‘COVID-19’ EXECUTIVE ORDER (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined the petition to validate the appellant’s designating petition was not timely commenced pursuant to Executive Order No. 202.8 passed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic:

… [T]he statute of limitations for commencing this Election Law article 16 proceeding was not tolled by a provision of Executive Order (Cuomo) No. 202.8 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8), issued on March 20, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which generally tolled limitations periods. Rather, this matter is governed by chapter 24 of the Laws of 2020, passed by the Legislature and signed into law by the Governor two days before the issuance of Executive Order No. 202.8, also in response to the COVID-19 pandemic … . That legislation set a new date for the filing of designating petitions and specifically provided that the time to commence an Election Law article 16 proceeding “shall be adjusted accordingly” … . Indeed, tolling the statute of limitations when the primary election will take place on June 23, 2020, is unworkable … for commencing Election Law article 16 proceedings, pertaining to the validity of designating petitions. We note that while the courts ceased accepting papers for filing in many legal matters due to the pandemic, they continued to accept filings of emergency Election Law applications, as such matters were deemed “essential” by the Chief Administrative Judge … . Matter of Echevarria v Board of Elections in the City of N.Y., 2020 NY Slip Op 02992, Second Dept 5-21-20

 

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