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WIRES WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO TRIP AND FALL WERE INTEGRAL TO THE WORK BEING PERFORMED AND CANNOT THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED DEBRIS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should have been dismissed. Plaintiff fell when his foot became entangled in electrical wires hanging from the ceiling. The wires were integral to the work being performed. Therefore the Industrial Code provision prohibiting the accumulation of debris did not apply. However the common law negligence (dangerous condition) cause of action properly survived summary judgment:

To prevail on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff “must set forth a violation of a specific rule or regulation promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor” … . Here, the plaintiff alleged a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(2), which requires that “[t]he parts of floors, platforms and similar areas where persons work or pass shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from scattered tools and materials and from sharp projections insofar as may be consistent with the work being performed.” However, 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(2) is “inapplicable [where] the material over which [a plaintiff] alleges he [or she] tripped was integral to the work being performed” … . Martinez v 281 Broadway Holdings, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 02773, Second Dept 5-13-20

 

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