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THE “FALSELY REPORTING AN INCIDENT” STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO DEFENDANT’S FALSE TWEETS ALLEGING A RACIALLY-MOTIVATED ASSAULT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s “falsely reporting an incident” conviction, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined defendant’s tweets were protected by the First Amendment. Defendant was accused of falsely tweeting she was the victim of a racially-motivated assault:

… [A]lthough it was “not unlikely” that defendant’s false tweets about a racial assault at a state university would cause public alarm (Penal Law § 240.50 [1]), what level of public alarm rises to the level of criminal liability? Indeed, United States v Alvarez (567 US at 734 [Breyer, J., concurring]) informs us that criminalizing false speech requires either proof of specific harm to identifiable victims or a great likelihood of harm. Certainly, general concern by those reading defendant’s tweets does not rise to that level, nor does the proof adduced at trial, which established that defendant’s tweets were “retweeted” a significant number of times. In fact, because these “retweets” led to nothing more than a charged online discussion about whether a racially motivated assault did in fact occur, which falls far short of meeting the standard set forth in United States v Alvarez (567 US at 734 [Breyer, J., concurring]), we reach the inescapable conclusion that Penal Law § 240.50 (1), as applied to defendant’s conduct, is unconstitutional. …

… “[T]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true” (United States v Alvarez, 567 US at 727) and “social media platforms are information-disseminating fora. By the very nature of social media, falsehoods can quickly and effectively be countered by truth, making the criminalizing of false speech on social media not ‘actually necessary’ to prevent alarm and inconvenience” … . This could not be more apparent here, where defendant’s false tweets were largely debunked through counter speech; thus, criminalizing her speech by way of Penal Law § 240.50 (1) was not actually necessary to prevent public alarm and inconvenience … . People v Burwell, 2020 NY Slip Op 02205, Third Dept 4-9-20

 

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