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DEFENDANT’S REPEATED REQUESTS TO REPRESENT HIMSELF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, reversed defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that defendant had been denied his right to represent himself. The opinion is basically a detailed rendition of the facts demonstrating that defendant repeatedly requested that he be allowed to represent himself and was repeatedly assigned new counsel after he repeatedly was found mentally fit for trial. There was no evidence defendant was seeking to delay the trial or otherwise interfere with the proceedings:

When a defendant desires to exercise the right to represent himself, “the court’s only function is to ensure that the defendant is acting knowingly and voluntarily, that is, that the defendant is aware of the disadvantages and risks of waiving his right to counsel” … . If the waiver is knowing and voluntary, the request must be granted … . * * *

The court’s belated finding … that defendant intended to “disrupt” the proceedings cannot be used as post-hoc justification of its earlier denials of repeated requests to proceed pro se. Defendant’s requests to proceed pro se were denied throughout 2008, 2009, and much of 2010, without mention of “disruption” as a basis.

It was hardly surprising that defendant expressed increasing frustration with the process, given that he had repeatedly been found fit to proceed, and yet the court continued to deny his requests to proceed pro se and to ignore his complaints regarding counsel. As the Court of Appeals has observed, in finding a defendant’s “outburst” insufficient to trump his right to self-representation,

“Just as the court may not rely on a postruling outburst to validate an erroneous denial, the court may not goad the defendant to disruptive behavior by conducting its inquiry in an abusive manner calculated to belittle a legitimate application. An outburst thus provoked will not justify the forfeiture of the right to self-representation” … .

That defendant on occasion agreed to the appointment of new lawyers does not render his requests to proceed pro se equivocal … . A defendant who elects to proceed pro se “is frequently motivated by dissatisfaction with trial strategy or a lack of confidence in counsel” … .

An erroneous denial of the right to defend onself is not subject to a harmless error analysis. We are therefore obliged to reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. People v Trammell, 2020 NY Slip Op 02190, First Dept 4-2-20

 

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