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PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST PERMITS GRANTING THE CONVERSION OF DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY FROM MANUFACTURING TO RETAIL; PROXIMITY TO DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY WAS NOT ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not have standing to contest the defendant City’s issuing permits allowing defendant CAB to convert property from manufacturing to retail. Plaintiff operated a grocery store 450 feet from CAB’s property. The Second Department held proximity was not enough to confer standing on plaintiff:

“In land use matters, . . . [the plaintiff] must show that it would suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large'” … . “An allegation of close proximity may give rise to an inference of damage or injury that enables a nearby property owner to challenge a land use decision without proof of actual injury” … . “However, this does not entitle the property owner to judicial review in every instance” … . “Rather, in addition to establishing that the effect of the proposed change is different from that suffered by the public generally, the [property owner] must establish that the interest asserted is arguably within the zone of interests the statute protects” … . Thus, “even where [the property owner’s] premises are physically close to the subject property, an ad hoc determination may be required as to whether a particular [property owner] itself has a legally protectable interest so as to confer standing” … .

Here, the plaintiff alleged standing on the basis of proximity, issues and interests within the zone of interests, and adverse impacts. We disagree with the Supreme Court’s finding that the plaintiff had standing to commence this action. The plaintiff failed to allege any harm distinct from that of the community at large … . 159-MP Corp. v CAB Bedford, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 01892, Second Dept 3-18-20

 

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