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RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; BECAUSE THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE CONVICTION WAS NOT CHALLENGED IT MUST BE REVERSED NOT REDUCED BY THE APPELLATE COURT; GRAND LARCENY AND POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY CONVICTIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; INADEQUATE PROOF OF VALUE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department reversed the reckless endangerment, grand larceny, possession of stolen property, and arson third degree convictions, and affirmed the murder, assault and arson second degree convictions. With respect to reckless endangerment first degree, the conviction was against the weight of the evidence and the appellate court could not reduce the conviction to a lesser included because defendant did not argue the evidence was legally insufficient. So the reckless endangerment conviction was reversed. The grand larceny/possession of stolen property convictions were not supported by adequate proof that the value of the stolen vehicle was more than $100. Arson third degree was dismissed as an inclusory concurrent count of arson in the second degree:

We agree with defendant … that the verdict finding him guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree is against the weight of the evidence. “A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he [or she] recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person” … . Count five of the indictment alleged that defendant recklessly engaged in conduct creating a grave risk of death to emergency responders when he intentionally started the fire. We agree with defendant that the verdict on that count is against the weight of the evidence because the People did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with depraved indifference to human life when he set the fire … . Inasmuch as defendant is challenging only the weight of the evidence with respect to that count and does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence with respect to that count, we cannot reduce the conviction to the lesser included offense of reckless endangerment in the second degree … . * * *

We further agree with defendant that the verdict finding him guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree is against the weight of the evidence. With respect to each of those counts, the People were required to establish that the value of the stolen motor vehicle exceeded $100 … . It is well settled that a witness “must provide a basis of knowledge for his [or her] statement of value before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence of such value” … . “Conclusory statements and rough estimates of value are not sufficient” … . Although the monetary element of each crime is quite low, the People did not attempt to meet that threshold through the testimony of any witness. The testimony of a detective that the vehicle was “[d]efinitely worth over probably 10,000” did not satisfy the monetary element of either crime inasmuch as he provided no basis of knowledge for his statement of value. We therefore further modify the judgment by reversing those parts convicting defendant of grand larceny in the fourth degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and dismissing counts eight and nine of the indictment. People v Box, 2020 NY Slip Op 01813, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

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