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LETTER AGREEMENT REGARDING A LEASE WAS NOT AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT; RATHER IT WAS AN AGREEMENT TO AGREE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined a letter agreement regarding a lease was not an enforceable contract but rather was an agreement to agree:

In a document dated June 27, 2012 (hereinafter the 2012 letter agreement), the parties “consolidate[d] all existing letter agreements to the same expiration date” of February 28, 2015. The 2012 letter agreement also stated that the terms of the lease were “extended to now terminate on Feb. 28, 2030,” with “terms to be determined at the expiration of this initial lease consolidation period.” The 2012 letter agreement further stated that any annual percentage increase in rent will not be less than five percent and will not exceed eight percent. …

A “mere agreement to agree, in which a material term is left for future negotiations, is unenforceable” … . “This is especially true of the amount to be paid for the sale or lease of real property” … . An agreement is not enforceable as a lease unless all of the essential terms are agreed upon, and if “any of these essential terms are missing and are not otherwise discernible by objective means, a lease has not been created” … .

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting, inter alia, a copy of the 2012 letter agreement, which demonstrated that the renewal provision was an unenforceable agreement to agree … . Reis v J.B. Kaufman Realty Co., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 01657, Second Dept 3-11-20

 

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