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PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH RPAPL 1306; DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s failure to comply with RPAPL 1306 required that defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be granted:

“RPAPL 1306 provides, in pertinent part, that within three business days of the mailing of the foreclosure notice pursuant to RPAPL 1304(1), every lender or assignee shall file’ certain information with the superintendent of financial services, including at a minimum, the name, address, last known telephone number of the borrower, and the amount claimed as due and owing on the mortgage, and such other information as will enable the superintendent to ascertain the type of loan at issue'” … . “Any complaint served in a proceeding initiated pursuant to [RPAPL article 13] shall contain, as a condition precedent to such proceeding, an affirmative allegation that at the time the proceeding is commenced, the plaintiff has complied with . . . this section” (RPAPL 1306[1]). Compliance with RPAPL 1306 is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action.

RPAPL 1306(1) became effective on February 13, 2010 (see L 2009, ch 507, § 5), one month before this action was commenced. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, it was not absolved from compliance with the statute by virtue of the fact that its RPAPL 1304 notices were purportedly mailed prior to the effective date of RPAPL 1306. …

… [I]t is … clear from the face of the complaint that it contains no “affirmative allegation that at the time the proceeding [wa]s commenced, the plaintiff ha[d] complied with” RPAPL 1306 … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Spanos, 2020 NY Slip Op 01324, Second Dept 2-26-20

 

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PROOF OF POSSESSION OF THE NOTE WHEN THE ACTION WAS COMMENCED WAS HEARSAY; PLAINTIFF... SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE...