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PEOPLE’S REQUEST TO DENY DISCLOSURE BECAUSE OF CONCERNS FOR WITNESS SAFETY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the prosecutor’s request to deny disclosure of certain exhibits should have been granted:

Pursuant to CPL 245.70(6), a party who has unsuccessfully sought, or opposed the granting of, a protective order relating to the name, address, contact information, or statements of a person may obtain expedited review by an individual justice of the intermediate appellate court to which an appeal from a judgment of conviction would be taken. Although the statute does not specify what standard the intermediate appellate justice is to apply in performing the expedited review, I concur that where, as here, “the issue involves balancing the defendant’s interest in obtaining information for defense purposes against concerns for witness safety and protection, the question is appropriately framed as whether the determination made by the trial court was a provident exercise of discretion” … .

Applying these standards to the matters at hand, I conclude that the Supreme Court’s determination to grant the People’s request only to the extent indicated was an improvident exercise of discretion. Under the particular facts and circumstances presented, concerns for witness safety and protection far outweigh the usefulness of the discovery of the material or information in question. Consequently, I grant the People’s application to review pursuant to CPL 245.70(6) and modify the protective order accordingly. People v Reyes, 2020 NY Slip Op 01275, Second Dept 2-21-20

 

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