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FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, TERMINATED MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS ON MENTAL-ILLNESS GROUNDS IN THE ABSENCE OF THE STATUTORILY-REQUIRED PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should not have terminated mother’s parental right on mental-illness grounds without the results of the statutorily-required examination. The psychologist appointed to evaluate mother (Horenstein) did not do so and rendered his opinion based upon a review of records of her hospitalization:

Pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b (6) (e), the court is required to order the parent, alleged to be mentally ill, to be examined by a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist and shall take testimony from the appointed expert … . Significantly, paragraph (c) of subdivision 6 prohibits a determination as to the legal sufficiency of the proof until such testimony is taken … . An exception exists “[i]f the parent refuses to submit to such court-ordered examination, or if the parent renders himself [or herself] unavailable . . . by departing from the state or by concealing himself [or herself] therein” … . In such instance, “the appointed psychologist or psychiatrist, upon the basis of other available information, . . . may testify without an examination of such parent, provided that such other information affords a reasonable basis for his [or her] opinion” … . * * *

… [W]e conclude that Family Court erred in proceeding with the termination of respondent’s parental rights without the statutorily-required examination. Horenstein pointed out that there was no basis to find that respondent refused to be evaluated. Nor did respondent make herself unavailable “by departing from the state or by concealing [herself] therein” … . To the contrary, her placement in CDPC was involuntary and, despite her release by December 1, 2017, no further attempt was made to schedule an evaluation. Because the statutory exception does not apply, Family Court lacked authority to determine the legal sufficiency of the proof without a contemporaneous evaluation … . Even though respondent raised no objection at the hearing, this statutory mandate requires that we remit the matter to Family Court for a new hearing and determination … . Matter of Rahsaan I. (Simone J.), 2020 NY Slip Op 01212, Third Dept 2-20-20

 

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