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DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE; DEFENDANT MADE A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTORCYCLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to set aside the defense verdict in this traffic accident case should have been granted. Defendant made a left turn in front of plaintiff’s motorcycle:

A court should be guided by the rule that, “if the verdict is one that reasonable persons could have rendered after receiving conflicting evidence, the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury” … . Here, as the court charged the jury, “defendant had a common-law duty to see that which [he] should have seen through the proper use of [his] senses” … . The evidence undisputedly established that the area of the accident did not have any obstructions and that defendant had a clear line of sight of oncoming traffic. Inasmuch as defendant admitted at trial that he never saw plaintiff or his motorcycle prior to the accident, we conclude that the finding that defendant was not negligent could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence … . Cramer v Schruefer, 2020 NY Slip Op 00728, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

 

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