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ALTHOUGH THE CITY GAVE A PERMIT TO A BUS COMPANY TO USE A PARKING LOT, THE CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT RELINQUISHED ALL CONTROL OVER THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PARKING LOT SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the City did not demonstrate it relinquished maintenance responsibilities for a parking lot licensed to a bus company in this slip and fall case:

… [T]he City failed to meet its prima facie burden of demonstrating that it relinquished control of the premises such that it had no duty to the plaintiff to remedy the allegedly defective condition. In support of its motion, the City submitted a copy of the permit agreement, as well as the deposition testimony of several City employees. The permit agreement provided that the bus company had some responsibility for maintenance of the premises, but that the permit also was revocable at will by the City, and the City reserved “the right at all times to free and interrupted access” to any portion of the premises. Moreover, the deposition testimony submitted by the City established, prima facie, that City employees made regular visual inspections of the premises.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff … , it cannot be said as a matter of law that the City relinquished control of the premises to the bus company such that it owed no duty to the plaintiff to remedy the allegedly defective condition… . D’Angelo v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 00569, Second Dept 1-29-20

 

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