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PROTECTIVE ORDER ALLOWING THE PEOPLE TO HOLD BACK INFORMATION (OTHERWISE SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE) UNTIL AFTER JURY SELECTION VACATED; MATTER REMITTED TO ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO OPPOSE THE REQUEST FOR THE ORDER; THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEW DISCOVERY PROVISIONS ADDRESSED IN SOME DETAIL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in an expedited appellate review of the issuance of a protective order by Supreme Court, vacated the protective order and sent the matter back to allow the defense to make an argument in opposition. The defendant is accused of stabbing his wife multiple times. The People, pursuant to CPL 245.70, ex parte, applied for and were granted an order delaying, until after jury selection, the turning over of information otherwise subject to automatic disclosure under CPL 245.70. The decision makes an effort to explain how these new disclosure provisions should be handled by the trial courts:

Unlike the prior discovery statute, which allowed the People to wait until the time of trial to turn over witness statements (see CPL former 240.45), the new statutory scheme provides that disclosure is to be made within days after arraignment (see CPL 245.10[1][a]). The new statute provides that there shall be a “presumption in favor of disclosure” when interpreting certain listed provisions of CPL article 245 (CPL 245.20[7]), although the provision relating to protective orders (CPL 245.70) is not among those that are listed (see CPL 245.20[7]).

CPL 245.70 provides that upon a showing of good cause by either party, the court may at any time order that discovery be denied, restricted, conditioned, or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate (see CPL 245.70[1]). It further provides that the court “may permit a party seeking or opposing a protective order under this section, or another affected person, to submit papers or testify on the record ex parte or in camera,” and that any such papers and a transcript of any such testimony may be sealed and constitute a part of the record on appeal (CPL 245.70[1]). …

The statute cannot be reasonably construed to permit a protective order to be sought entirely ex parte in every case. Since entirely ex parte proceedings should be allowed only in some cases, it necessarily follows that proceedings on applications for a protective order should be entirely ex parte only where the applicant has demonstrated the clear necessity for the entirety of the application, and the submissions in support of it, to be shielded from the opposing party. …

The necessity for appellate intervention would have been reduced had the Supreme Court, either before or after granting the subject protective order, afforded defense counsel the opportunity to be heard and thereafter determined whether to grant, adhere to, modify, or rescind the protective order. People v Bonifacio, 2020 NY Slip Op 00517, Second Dept 1-23-20

Similar issues and result in People v Reyes-Fuentes, 2020 NY Slip Op 00518, Second Dept 1-23-20

 

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THE COURT OF CLAIMS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION CREDITED BOTH EXPERTS,... SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A PROTECTIVE ORDER ALLOWING...