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IT WAS ALLEGED ONE MAN INTENDED TO DOUSE ANOTHER WITH LIQUID IN A CUP BUT UNINTENTIONALLY THREW THE CUP ITSELF CAUSING INJURY; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INJURY WAS CAUSED BY INTENTIONAL CONDUCT OR AN ACCIDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff insurer’s (Unitrin’s) motion for summary judgment in this insurance-coverage dispute should not have been granted. Apparently Sullivan was in one car and the injured party, Ciminello, was in another car when Sullivan allegedly attempted to throw liquid that was in a cup into Ciminello’s car. It was alleged that Sullivan unintentionally threw the entire cup, not just its contents, which injured Ciminello. So there was a question of fact whether Ciminello was injured by intentional conduct (not covered by insurance) or an accident (which would be covered):

Ciminello raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the harm was inherent in the intentional act committed … . Ciminello submitted evidence that, although Sullivan and his passenger intended to douse Ciminello with the liquid contained in the cup, there was no intent to throw the cup and strike Ciminello with it. As the instant case does not fall within the narrow class of cases in which the intentional act exclusion applies regardless of the insured’s subjective intent … , there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the event qualified as an “accident,” as defined by the policy … . Unitrin Auto & Home Ins. Co. v Sullivan, 2020 NY Slip Op 00452, Second Dept 1-22-20

 

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