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ALTHOUGH THE TRUCK DRIVER WAS STEPPING OFF A RAMP ATTACHED TO THE BACK OF HIS TRACTOR TRAILER WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY A VAN, THE DRIVER WAS OCCUPYING THE TRUCK WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INSURER’S UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the insurer’s (Utica’s) petition to permanently stay arbitration in this traffic accident case should not have been granted. A truck driver, Steward, was struck by a van when he was stepping down from a ramp attached to the back of the tractor trailer. Utica argued Steward was a pedestrian, not an occupant of the truck and therefore Steward was not covered:

The minivan that hit Steward had minimal insurance coverage, and Steward filed a Request for SUM Arbitration seeking coverage under the New York Supplementary Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists (“SUM”) Endorsement of his employer’s Utica Mutual commercial automobile liability insurance policy … . …

The SUM endorsement in the petitioner’s policy, consistent with the statutory requirement, defines “occupying” as “in, upon, entering into, or exiting from a motor vehicle” (see Insurance Law § 3420[f][3]). In accordance with the liberal interpretation afforded the term “occupying” … , we find, as a matter of law, that Steward was “upon” the tractor-trailer at the time of the accident such that he was “occupying” the tractor-trailer within the meaning of the SUM endorsement. Steward’s testimony established that at the time of the accident, he had stepped upon the Moffet ramp which was attached to the tractor-trailer, and that he was struck by the minivan while his right leg was still on the ramp, and while he was stepping down with his left leg. Thus, although Steward had been away from the tractor-trailer during the work day, his testimony established that at the time of the accident, he was in physical contact with the vehicle, such that he was “occupying” it … . Matter of Utica Mut. Assur. Co. v Steward, 2020 NY Slip Op 00285, Second Dept 1-17-20

 

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