You are here: / / PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT BY DEFENDANT ARE...
, ,

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT BY DEFENDANT ARE SUFFICIENT TO ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER NEW YORK CITY’S VICTIMS OF GENDER-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE PROTECTION LAW; THERE IS NO NEED TO ALLEGE SIMILAR ASSAULTS AGAINST OTHER WOMEN TO DEMONSTRATE ANIMUS ON THE BASIS OF GENDER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, over a concurring opinion, determined that plaintiff’s complaint, alleging rape and sexual assault, stated a valid cause of action under New York City’s Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM). The central question on appeal was the meaning of the term “animus.” Supreme Court held that allegations defendant had sexually assaulted other women were properly included in the complaint to demonstrate animus. The First Department held plaintiff’s allegations of rape and assault, without allegations involving other women, were sufficient:

… [P]laintiff’s claims in the amended complaint that she was raped and sexually assaulted are sufficient to allege animus on the basis of gender. She need not allege any further evidence of gender-based animus. Defendant has conceded that the allegations herein are sufficient to show that the acts alleged were “committed because of gender or on the basis of gender.” That the alleged rape and sexual assault was “due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender” is sufficiently pleaded by the nature of the crimes alleged.

Rape and sexual assault are, by definition, actions taken against the victim without the victim’s consent … . Without consent, sexual acts such as those alleged in the complaint are a violation of the victim’s bodily autonomy and an expression of the perpetrator’s contempt for that autonomy. Coerced sexual activity is dehumanizing and fear-inducing. Malice or ill will based on gender is apparent from the alleged commission of the act itself. Animus inheres where consent is absent. Breest v Haggis, 2019 NY Slip Op 09398, First Dept 12-26-19

 

You might also like
REAR DRIVER MUST TAKE WEATHER CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR, PLANTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE.
SUIT ALLEGING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE SALE OF AN ASSET OWNED NEARLY ENTIRELY BY BANKRUPT LEHMAN BROTHERS DISMISSED.
IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE, LONG-ARM JURISDICTION WAS PROPERLY EXERCISED OVER AN OUT-OF-STATE CATHOLIC DIOCESE WHICH EMPLOYED DEFENDANT PRIEST WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO A NEW YORK PARISH (FIRST DEPT). ​
INSURER WHICH OPTED NOT TO DEFEND THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE WAS REQUIRED TO INDEMNIFY THE INSURERS WHICH SETTLED THE CLAIM FOR BOTH DAMAGES AND EXCESS ATTORNEYS’ FEES, PLAINTIFF HIRED A MORE EXPENSIVE LAW FIRM ($795/HR) RATHER THAN USE THE FIRM HIRED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CARRIER ($150/HR).
ADMISSION OF THE RESULTS OF A MACHINE GENERATED BLOOD TEST WITHOUT THE TESTIMONY OF THE OPERATOR OF THE MACHINE DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE.
EVIDENCE OF DEBRIS ON FLOOR WAS SUFFICIENT TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS WERE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 241(6) AND 200, PLAINTIFF STEPPED INTO A HOLE BUT DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE HOLE WAS OBSCURED BY THE DEBRIS (FIRST DEPT).
NYC LOFT BOARD SHOULD NOT HAVE REJECTED TENANTS’ WITHDRAWAL OF THE LOFT LAW CONVERSION APPLICATION BECAUSE THERE WAS AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO OBTAIN RENT REGULATION COVERAGE OUTSIDE THE LOFT LAW’S STATUTORY SCHEME (FIRST DEPT). ​
Further Proceedings Are Stayed When Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw Is Granted

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS’ BREACH OF A STIPULATION OF... THE BUILDING OWNER AND MANAGER WERE ADDITIONAL INSUREDS UNDER A POLICY ISSUED...