You are here: / / FORMER SAME SEX PARTNER WHO AGREED TO THE CONCEPTION OF A CHILD CARRIED...

FORMER SAME SEX PARTNER WHO AGREED TO THE CONCEPTION OF A CHILD CARRIED BY HER FORMER PARTNER DEMONSTRATED SHE HAD STANDING AS A PARENT TO SEEK PARENTING TIME WITH THE CHILD (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined that petitioner, who participated in the conception of the child (by artificial insemination) carried by her then same-sex partner, was a “parent” entitled to visitation (parenting time) with the child pursuant to Matter of Brooke S.B. v Elizabeth A.C.C. (28 NY3d 1 [2016]):

… [T]he parties agreed to conceive a child using artificial insemination. Both parties attended appointments with a fertility doctor. In testimony that Family Court found to be credible, petitioner stated that she and respondent agreed to select a sperm donor who would reflect petitioner’s ethnic background. There were two inseminations; petitioner was present and injected the sperm on at least one of these occasions. Petitioner’s credit card was used to pay the related expenses. …  Petitioner attended at least one baby shower where friends and family members of both parties were present. Petitioner attended respondent’s prenatal appointments, was present when the child was born, and cut the child’s umbilical cord. The child was given two last names, reflecting the parties’ two surnames. … Petitioner testified that the child was named, in part, after petitioner’s mother. Petitioner assisted in buying items for the child and shared day-care costs with respondent. The two parties are listed as the child’s two mothers in some of her medical and immunization records. Respondent testified that she told petitioner that the child would be part of petitioner’s life if they continued to reside together and also if they separated, so long as petitioner did not engage in illegal activities, but that if petitioner did so engage, she would not have a role in the child’s life.

Upon this record, we find that Family Court correctly determined that petitioner falls within the statutory definition of a parent and, thus, has standing in this proceeding. Contrary to respondent’s argument, Family Court did not err in applying the conception test to determine petitioner’s standing rather than a “functional” test that would have examined the relationship between petitioner and the child after the child’s birth … . The evidence fully establishes that the parties planned jointly for the child’s conception, participated jointly in the process of conceiving the child, planned jointly for her birth, and planned to raise her together. Accordingly, petitioner satisfied her burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she and respondent entered into an agreement to conceive the child and raise her as co-parents. Thus, she established her standing to seek custody and parenting time under the conception test without regard to her subsequent relationship with the child … . Matter of Heather NN. v Vinnette OO., 2019 NY Slip Op 09325, Third Dept 12-26-19

 

You might also like
Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants Exempt from a Consistency Review Under New York’s Coastal Management Program—No State Environmental Impact Statements Required—Federal Environmental Impact Statements Prepared in the 1970’s Deemed Sufficient to Trigger the Exemption Under the Plain Meaning of the Statutory and Regulatory Language
Even In a Nonjury Trial, a Defendant Should Not Be In Shackles Unless Reasons Are Placed on the Record
THE HEARSAY MISBEHAVIOR REPORT, UNSUPPORTED BY ANY INVESTIGATION, DID NOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER’S GUILT; DETERMINATION ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT). ​
Failure to Take Steps to Verify and Corroborate the Information from a Confidential Source Required Annulment and Expungement of the Misbehavior Determination
CLAIMANT ADEQUATELY IDENTIFIED THE RULING OBJECTED TO IN HER APPLICATION FOR BOARD REVIEW; HER APPLICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REJECTED ON THAT GROUND (THIRD DEPT).
UNION REPRESENTING CITY EMPLOYEES HAS STANDING TO CONTEST THE CREATION OF A NEW CITY DEPARTMENT AFFECTING THOSE EMPLOYEES (THIRD DEPT).
CORNELL DID NOT HAVE TO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES IN ITS STUDENT CODE TO REFUSE ADMISSION TO PETITIONER WHO OMITTED FROM HIS APPLICATION THE FACT HE HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM ANOTHER COLLEGE (THIRD DEPT).
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH PROPERLY DENIED THE FOIL REQUEST FOR CERTAIN DOCUMENTS ON THE GROUND THE DOCUMENTS WERE NOT ‘REASONABLY DESCRIBED’ (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE WHERE METHAMPHETAMINE WAS BEING PRODUCED AND APPARENT... THE SUBCONTRACTORS DID NOT SIGN THE PRIMARY CONTRACT WHICH INCLUDED AN ARBITRATION...