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AN ATTORNEY, A PRINCIPAL IN THE CORPORATIONS OWNING SEVERAL BUILDINGS, WAS PROPERLY FOUND TO BE IN THE “OUTDOOR ADVERTISING BUSINESS” WITHOUT A LICENSE BECAUSE HE ADVERTISED HIS LAW PRACTICE IN SIGNS ON THE BUILDINGS (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined the corporations which owned the buildings were separate from the attorney, a principal in the corporations, who advertised his law office in signs on the buildings. Therefore the attorney was making space available for outdoor advertising to “others” within the meaning of the NYC Administrative Code regulating outdoor advertising. The code requires “outdoor advertising companies” engaged in the :outdoor advertising business” to be licensed. The attorney (Ciafone) was fined for outdoor advertising without a license:

Contrary to the position of the Appellate Division dissent, preserving the distinction between the corporate entities and Mr. Ciafone does not “penalize him for forming corporate entities to own the buildings for tax and liability purposes”… . Myriad statutes and regulations apply to corporations, but not natural persons; those are not “penalties” for creating a corporate legal entity, but consequences of choosing that form of ownership. The New York City Council could rationally conclude that a corporation engaged in the provision of advertising to others, even others who have an ownership interest in the corporation, should be subjected to greater financial disincentives for violating signage laws than natural persons who are advertising themselves. Matter of Franklin St. Realty Corp. v NYC Envtl. Control Bd., 2019 NY Slip Op 08976, CtApp 12-17-19

 

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