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BANK DID NOT SUBMIT SUFFICIENT PROOF OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT OR COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1304 NOTICE REQUIREMENTS; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank’s (Chase’s) motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted, The court held: (1) the conclusory affidavit submitted by the bank  to prove defendant’s default had no probative value, the business record itself should have been provided; (2) compliance with the mailing provisions of RPAPL 1304 was not proven by the bank; (3) failure to comply with the notice provisions of RPAPL 1304 can be raised as a defense at any time; and (4) by not raising the failure to provide the notice required by the mortgage in the answer or a motion to amend the answer, the defendant waived that defense:

Here, the affidavit of Mimoza Petreska, a vice president of Chase, submitted in support of Chase’s motion, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant, was insufficient to establish the defendant’s default in payment under the note … . The only business record annexed to Petreska’s affidavit with regard to the default was a copy of the notice of default dated May 15, 2012, which merely stated, in conclusory fashion, that the defendant’s loan was in default. Conclusory affidavits lacking a factual basis are without evidentiary value … . Moreover, “[w]hile a witness may read into the record from the contents of a document which has been admitted into evidence, a witness’s description of a document not admitted into evidence is hearsay” … . “[I]t is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, that serves as proof of the matter asserted” … . JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Akanda, 2019 NY Slip Op 08180, Second Dept 11-13-19

 

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