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EVIDENCE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF FRAUDULENTLY PRACTICING DENTISTRY IN THE PAST WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THE INSTANT PROCEEDING ALLEGING THE UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF DENTISTRY; THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT WAS EXACERBATED BY REFERENCES TO THE ALLEGED FRAUD BY THE PROSECUTOR IN SUMMATION AND BY THE JUDGE IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY; DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined that the probative value of evidence submitted to the jury was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Defendant was charged under the Education Law with practicing dentistry without a license. Defendant alleged he was legally acting as a clinical director in a dental office. The jury was presented with evidence indicating defendant had been previously accused of practicing dentistry fraudulently:

Evidence that the defendant voluntarily surrendered his license to practice dentistry in 2000 was properly admitted to show that the defendant was unlicensed and was aware that he was unlicensed. However, the evidence submitted to the jury, which consisted of the defendant’s “application to surrender license,” stated not only that he was voluntarily surrendering his license, but also that he was doing so because he was “under investigation for allegations that [he] practiced the profession of dentistry fraudulently, within the purview and meaning of New York Education Law section 6509(2), and committed unprofessional conduct by engaging in conduct in the practice of the profession of dentistry evidencing moral unfitness to practice.” During summation, the prosecutor argued that the defendant had surrendered his license because he “had practiced the profession of dentistry fraudulently.” Thereafter, during the Supreme Court’s instructions to the jury, the court instructed the jurors that “there was evidence in the case that on another occasion, the defendant engaged in criminal conduct and was convicted of a crime,” which was “offered as evidence for [the jurors’] consideration on the questions of whether those facts are inextricably interwoven with the crimes charged, if [they] find the evidence believable, [they] may consider it for that limited purpose and for none other.”

The references to fraud and moral turpitude were not relevant to the issue of whether the defendant was unlicensed and was aware that he was unlicensed. Under the circumstances, any probative value of the evidence of the prior fraud was outweighed by its prejudicial effect … .  People v Hollander, 2019 NY Slip Op 07950, Second Dept 11-6-19

 

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THE ONE-HALF INCH DEFECT IN A STEP WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW AND DEFENDANT... DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE REBUTTING...