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NO APPEAL LIES FROM THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA OF NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that no appeal lies from the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect:

… [A] motion pursuant to CPL 220.60 seeking to withdraw a plea to an indictment is part of a criminal action or, at the least, “related to a . . . completed criminal action,” so as to come within the statutory definition of a “[c]riminal proceeding” (CPL 1.20[18]; … ). Moreover, in light of the nature of the relief sought in the motion, the motion is, by its nature, criminal, rather than civil … . Accordingly, proper statutory authority under the Criminal Procedure Law must exist in order for the defendant to appeal from the denial of the motion … .

Such statutory authority does not exist. CPL 450.10 only provides that a defendant may appeal as of right from a judgment, sentence, or order made pursuant to specified provisions of CPL article 440, and thus, does not provide for appellate review, as of right, from an order denying a motion pursuant to CPL 220.60, to withdraw a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. Nor does CPL 450.15 allow for such an appeal by permission, as that statute only permits an appeal from orders made pursuant to specified provisions of CPL article 440, and “[a] sentence . . . not otherwise appealable as of right” (CPL 450.15[3]). Finally, there is no avenue for appeal through CPL 330.20, which permits a party “to proceedings conducted in accordance with the provisions of this section” to appeal, by permission, from certain orders rendered under CPL 330.20 (CPL 330.20[21]). The orders specified do not include an order denying a motion pursuant to CPL 220.60 to withdraw the plea … . People v Delano F., 2019 NY Slip Op 07089, Second Dept 10-2-19

 

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