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PLAINTIFF STATED CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM UNDERPAYMENT OF WAGES FOR MANUAL LABOR PURSUANT TO THE LABOR LAW; PLAINTIFF WAS PAID BI-WEEKLY; THE LABOR LAW REQUIRES PAYMENT WEEKLY (FIRST DEPT)

The First Department determined plaintiff stated causes of action under the Labor Law stemming from her employer’s paying her bi-weekly, rather than weekly, for manual labor, in violation of Labor Law 191. Plaintiff sought liquidated damages, interest and attorney’s fees pursuant to Labor Law 198 (1-a).  The bi-weekly payments were deemed “underpayment” and the Labor Law provided plaintiff with a private right of action:

… [T]he term underpayment encompasses the instances where an employer violates the frequency requirements of section 191(1)(a) but pays all wages due before the commencement of an action. “In the absence of any controlling statutory definition, we construe words of ordinary import with their usual and commonly understood meaning, and in that connection have regarded dictionary definitions as useful guideposts’ in determining the meaning of a word or phrase” … . The word underpayment is the noun for the verb underpay; underpay is defined as “to pay less than what is normal or required” … . The moment that an employer fails to pay wages in compliance with section 191(1)(a), the employer pays less than what is required. …

In interpreting the liquidated damages provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), the Supreme Court has held that, regardless of whether an employee has been paid wages owed before the commencement of the action, the statute provides a liquidated damages remedy for the “failure to pay the statutory minimum on time,” … Labor Law § 198(1-a), although not identical to the FLSA liquidated damages provision (29 USC § 216[b]), has “no meaningful differences, and both are designed to deter wage-and-hour violations in a manner calculated to compensate the party harmed” … . …

Labor Law § 198(1-a) expressly provides a private right of action for a violation of Labor Law § 191. Defendant’s position that no private right of action exists is dependent on its erroneous assertion that the late payment of wages is not an underpayment of wages.

Furthermore, even if Labor Law § 198 does not expressly authorize a private action for violation of the requirements of Labor Law § 191, a remedy may be implied since plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted, the recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose of the statute and the creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme … . Vega v CM & Assoc. Constr. Mgt., LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 06459, First Dept 9-10-19

 

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