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NEGLIGENCE, BREACH OF CONTRACT AND DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS BROUGHT BY A DISABLED FORMER POLICE OFFICER CONCERNING GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department affirmed the grant of summary judgment to all defendants in this action by a disabled former police officer concerning claims for General Municipal Law 207-c benefits:

With respect to the City defendants, … we conclude that the court properly dismissed the negligence and gross negligence causes of action against them inasmuch as they were entitled to governmental function immunity based on the discretion they are afforded in administering payments of General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits … . Although plaintiff’s negligence and gross negligence causes of action involved the health care services that he was receiving, the City defendants were engaged in a governmental function because they were merely administering the payment of General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits, i.e., they did not actually provide plaintiff with health care services ;;; . Moreover, the City defendants were entitled to immunity inasmuch as the administration of section 207-c benefits involved the exercise of their discretion and the record establishes that the City defendants denied payment of the disputed claims for benefits after actually exercising this discretion … .

… Plaintiff was not a party to the contracts between [the remaining] defendants and City defendants, and therefore liability may be established where, inter alia, “the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of [its] duties, launches a force or instrument of harm” (Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 140 [2002]). Here, the undisputed evidence established that the [defendants] did not have authority to deny payment of plaintiff’s claims for General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits. That authority rested, at all relevant times, with the City defendants. Thus, it cannot be said that these defendants launched any “instrument of harm” because they never made the decision to deny any of plaintiff’s claims for payment of medical care and treatment. …

… [W]e note that plaintiff, as a public employee, may not sue his employer under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, as plaintiff has done here … . Where, as here, plaintiff’s causes of action are “related to the terms, conditions and privileges of his employment[, i.e., his entitlement to benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c, they] are covered by Title I” and not Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act … . Vassenelli v City of Syracuse, 2019 NY Slip Op 05878, Fourth Dept 7-31-19

 

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