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MOTHER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION TO VACATE THE ADOPTION OF HER CHILD BY HER FORMER HUSBAND PURSUANT TO THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT (ICWA) BECAUSE THE ACT ONLY APPLIES TO CHILDREN REMOVED FROM A PARENT’S CUSTODY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined mother did not have standing to bring an action pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to vacate an order of adoption in favor of her former husband. Mother alleged the adoption was not accomplished in compliance with the ICWA. The ICWA only applies to a parent from whose custody the child was removed and the child had not been removed from mother’s custody:

… [A]lthough the adoption proceeding involved the voluntary termination of the birth father’s parental rights to the subject child, the plain language of both 25 USC § 1914 and 25 CFR 23.137(a) is clear that only the child, the parent or Indian custodian from whose custody the child has been removed, and the Indian child’s tribe have standing to allege a violation of sections 1911, 1912, or 1913 of the ICWA . Since the mother does not fall in… to any of those categories, she lacked standing to allege a violation of sections 1911, 1912, or 1913 of the ICWA … . “[T]he language of [section] 1914 …  limits standing to challenge state-law terminations of parental right to parents from whose custody such child was removed'” … . Matter of Connor (Mariann D.–Jacob D.), 2019 NY Slip Op 05979, Second Dept 7-31-19

 

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