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87 DAY DELAY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PEOPLE DESPITE THE ‘READY FOR TRIAL’ ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT, INDICTMENT DISMISSED ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court and dismissing the indictment on speedy trial grounds, determined the 87 day delay during which the People sought a superseding indictment was attributable to the People despite their “ready for trial” announcement and despite the absence of a specific request for an adjournment:

… [The]period of delay was “attributable to [the People’s] inaction and directly implicate[d] their ability to proceed to trial” on a charge of CPCS in the fifth degree, i.e., the crime that the People sought to add by way of a superseding indictment and the sole crime for which defendant was ultimately convicted … . Contrary to the court’s determination, the 87-day period was not attributable to the court given that it was “the People’s inaction [in securing a superseding indictment that] resulted in a delay in the court’s [trial of the action]” … . Contrary to the People’s contention, it is well established that postreadiness delay may be assessed “notwithstanding that the People have answered ready for trial within the statutory time limit” … and notwithstanding the absence of an explicit prosecutorial request for an adjournment … . Although certain periods of time may be excluded from assessment as postreadiness delay where the People successfully invoke one of the exceptions enumerated in CPL 30.30 (4) … , the People have identified no exception that might excuse the 87-day delay at issue here … . People v Johnson, 2019 NY Slip Op 05920, Fourth Dept 7-31-19

 

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