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SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED WHETHER THE MATTER WAS ARBITRABLE INSTEAD OF SENDING IT TO AN ARBITRATION PANEL, THE APPELLANTS ARGUED THEY WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT WITH THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that it is the court’s role, in the first instance, to decide whether a matter is arbitrable. Here the appellants argued they were not parties to the agreement with the arbitration clause. Supreme Court erroneously referred that issue to an arbitration panel. The Second Department remitted the matter to Supreme Court to resolve the arbitrability question:

It is a “well-settled proposition that the question of arbitrability is an issue generally for judicial determination in the first instance” … . “If the court determines that the parties had not made an agreement to arbitrate, that concludes the matter and a stay of arbitration will be granted or the application to compel arbitration will be denied” … . This threshold determination must be made by the court unless the parties have “evinced a clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate arbitrability” … . Since the determination of whether the appellants were bound by the arbitration provision in the payment agreement was a threshold question for the courts, and not the arbitrator, to decide, we disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination to refer that issue to an arbitration panel … . Matter of Kent Waterfront Assoc., LLC v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 2019 NY Slip Op 05664, Second Dept 7-17-19

 

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