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You are here: Home1 / Administrative Law2 / IN THIS EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER DISPUTE ABOUT A HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM CONTRIBUTION,...
Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, Employment Law, Municipal Law

IN THIS EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER DISPUTE ABOUT A HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM CONTRIBUTION, THE CONTINUING WRONG DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, EACH PAYCHECK WITH THE PREMIUM DEDUCTION WAS NOT AN INDEPENDENT WRONG (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the continuing wrong doctrine did not toll the statute of limitations in this employee-employer dispute about a health insurance premium contribution. The petitioner unsuccessfully argued each paycheck with the premium deduction was an independent wrong which tolled the statute of limitations:

A challenge to an administrative determination must be commenced within four months of the time the determination is “final and binding upon the petitioner” (CPLR 217[1]). “A challenged determination is final and binding when it has its impact’ upon the petitioner who is thereby aggrieved” … . An administrative determination regarding payment of salary or pay adjustments is final and binding, and a challenge thereto accrues, when the petitioner receives a check or salary payment reflecting the administrative determination … .

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the continuing wrong doctrine does not apply here to toll the statute of limitations … . The doctrine “may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct” … . “The distinction is between a single wrong that has continuing effects and a series of independent, distinct wrongs” … . Here, the Town made the determination to classify the petitioner as an employee hired after December 31, 2014, subject to a 15% health insurance premium contribution requirement, as reflected in her first paycheck issued in April 2015, more than two years prior to the commencement of this proceeding. Each subsequent paycheck deduction “represent[ed] the consequences of [that allegedly] wrongful act[ ] in the form of continuing damages,” and was not an independent wrong in itself … . Matter of Salomon v Town of Wallkill, 2019 NY Slip Op 05671, Second Dept 7-17-19

 

July 17, 2019
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-07-17 09:38:062020-01-26 17:23:07IN THIS EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER DISPUTE ABOUT A HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM CONTRIBUTION, THE CONTINUING WRONG DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, EACH PAYCHECK WITH THE PREMIUM DEDUCTION WAS NOT AN INDEPENDENT WRONG (SECOND DEPT).
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