You are here: / / PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY ABOUT HOW THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT HAPPENED FOUND...
, , ,

PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY ABOUT HOW THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT HAPPENED FOUND INCREDIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE, DISSENT ARGUED THE TESTIMONY RAISED CLASSIC QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JURY TO DETERMINE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case was properly granted. The majority argued plaintiff’s testimony was incredible and therefore was properly disregarded. The dissent argued plaintiff’s testimony raised classic questions of fact about how the accident happened. The collision occurred when plaintiff was attempting to change lanes. The majority interpreted plaintiff’s testimony to mean that she was straddling two lanes and was not moving when the truck struck her SUV, which, based on photographic evidence, the majority found incredible as a matter of law:

The photographic evidence shows that plaintiff’s SUV struck the rear of defendants’ tractor-trailer as plaintiff was attempting to merge into defendants’ truck’s lane of traffic. Thus, plaintiff violated her “duty not to enter a lane of moving traffic until it was safe to do so” (… see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128[a] …), “and [her] failure to heed this duty constitutes negligence per se”. * * ^

… [I]n summary judgment analysis, we must discount the plaintiff’s testimony where the plaintiff has “relied solely on [her] own testimony, uncorroborated by any other witnesses or evidence,” and her testimony belied “common sense” … . As these circumstances are presented in this case, plaintiff’s testimony was properly “disregarded as being without evidentiary value” … . Thus, plaintiff’s testimony raised no triable issues of fact. Castro v Hatim, 2019 NY Slip Op 05639, First Dept 7-16-19

 

You might also like
THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INQUIRED FURTHER WHEN SEVERAL PROSPECTIVE JURORS INDICATED THEY WOULD BE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THE VICTIM IN THIS SEXUAL ABUSE CASE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THEY PAID A BROKER FOR THE INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED BY DEFENDANT INSURER BUT THE INSURER CANCELLED THE POLICY FOR NONPAYMENT; THE INSURER ALLEGED THE BROKER WAS NOT IN THE CHAIN OF BROKERS LEADING FROM PLAINTIFFS TO THE INSURER; QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).
A JUDGE CANNOT ORDER DISCOVERY IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION WHICH IS A SIGNATORY TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONVENTION (FIRST DEPT).
MOTION TO VACATE THE EXECUTED WARRANT OF EVICTION PROPERLY GRANTED.
SUBSTANTIAL PAIN ELEMENT OF ASSAULT THIRD EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).
PARTY ADMISSIONS WERE NOT HEARSAY AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY SUPREME COURT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6), 200 ACTION; THE “PARTY-ADMISSIONS” ARGUMENT, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BEFORE SUPREME COURT, CAN BE CONSIDERED AND DEEMED DISPOSITIVE ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO RETURN THE CHILD TO MOTHER DURING THE PENDENCY OF NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS; MOTHER HAD INJURED THE CHILD AND THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE IMPOSITION OF CONDITIONS FOR THE CHILD’S RETURN WILL ENSURE THE CHILD’S SAFETY (FIRST DEPT).
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE; THE PROVISION RELIED ON BY THE EMPLOYER TO AVOID PAYING DEFENDANT’S EARNED SALARY UPON TERMINATION APPLIED ONLY TO THOSE CURRENTLY EMPLOYED (ALLOWING PAYMENT TO BE DEFERRED WHEN AVAILABLE FUNDS ARE INSUFFICIENT); A DIFFERENT PROVISION REQUIRING PAYMENT IN CASH APPLIED TO TERMINATED EMPLOYEES (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

GUILTY PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, COLLOQUY DID NOT INFORM DEFENDANT... THE INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (ICPC) APPLIES ONLY TO...