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HOTEL WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THIS THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT CASE, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS STABBED TO DEATH AT A PARTY AT THE HOTEL, THERE WAS AN EXTENSIVE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AT THE HOTEL AND THERE WAS NO SECURITY ON THE NIGHT OF THE STABBING (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined that the facts of this case supported a finding that the hotel (Howard Johnson) where plaintiff’s decedent was stabbed to death was negligent as a matter of law. There was an extensive history of criminal acts, including assaults, at the hotel and there was no security on the night of the stabbing:

… [I]n certain “rare” cases ,,, , a plaintiff may be awarded summary judgment on the issue of a defendant’s negligence where “there is no conflict at all in the evidence” and “the defendant’s conduct fell far below any permissible standard of due care” … . The case at bar presents such an instance where there is no triable issue of fact as to the defendant’s negligence, entitling the plaintiff to summary judgment on the issue of liability on the first and third causes of action insofar as asserted against Howard Johnson.

“A possessor of real property is under a duty to maintain reasonable security measures to protect those lawfully on the premises from reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties” … . This includes the common-law duty to take “minimal precautions” to protect tenants and visitors from foreseeable harm, including foreseeable criminal conduct by a third person … . “To establish foreseeability, there is no requirement that the past experience of criminal activity be of the same type as that to which the plaintiff was subjected, but the criminal conduct at issue must be shown to be reasonably predictable based on prior occurrences of the same or similar criminal activity at a location sufficiently proximate to the subject location” … . “[T]he duty to employ protective measures arises when it is shown that the possessor of the property either knows or has reason to know from past experience that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons . . . which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor'” … . Davis v Commack Hotel, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 05385, Second Dept 7-3-19

 

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