You are here: / / DEFENDANT INSURANCE AGENT WAS NOT UNDER A DUTY TO NOTIFY THE INSURER OF...

DEFENDANT INSURANCE AGENT WAS NOT UNDER A DUTY TO NOTIFY THE INSURER OF THE INSURED’S DEATH OR TO MAKE SURE ADDITIONAL INSUREDS WERE NAMED ON THE POLICY AFTER THE INSURED’S DEATH; THE DECEDENT’S DAUGHTER CONTINUED TO PAY THE HOUSE INSURANCE PREMIUMS AFTER HER MOTHER’S DEATH, WHEN THE HOUSE WAS DESTROYED BY FIRE THE INSURER DISCLAIMED COVERAGE BECAUSE ONLY THE DECEDENT WAS NAMED ON THE POLICY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant insurance agent did not owe a duty to decedent’s daughter, Tomaino, or the estate, with respect to the insurance on decedent’s home. Decedent was the only person named on the house insurance policy. Decedent died in 2010. Tomaino continued to pay the premium to defendant after her mother’s death. When the place was destroyed by fire in 2014 decedent was the only named insured. Allstate disclaimed coverage. Tomaino alleged defendant owed her and the estate a duty to notify the insurer of decedent’s death and to make sure additional insured were named in the policy. The Fourth Department that no such duty was owed, even if defendant was aware of the death of Tomaino’s mother.

Defendant met his initial burden of establishing as a matter of law that he owed no duty to plaintiff, Tomaino, or decedent’s estate inasmuch as he demonstrated that none was a client. Indeed, defendant’s submissions established that decedent, alone, was his client and that, after her death, no one represented the estate until September 2014, approximately eight months after the fire and four years after her death. …

,,, [E]ven assuming, arguendo, that Tomaino was a client of defendant, we conclude that defendant established his entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. Defendant established that he had no common-law duty to advise, guide, or direct her to obtain insurance coverage for additional insureds in light of decedent’s death … , and he further established that he did not ” assume or acquire duties in addition to those fixed at common law’ ” … . Here, defendant demonstrated that there were no payments made to him beyond the alleged premium payments, that there was no interaction with Tomaino regarding questions of coverage, and that no special relationship was formed between himself and Tomaino …. Indeed, defendant submitted the deposition testimony of Tomaino, in which she testified that there was no discussion with defendant about any need for changes to the policy and that she was not asked for a copy of any death certificate, thus establishing the absence of any interaction regarding questions of coverage. Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, that Tomaino was a client of defendant and that she informed him of decedent’s death and made premium payments to him in 2012 and 2013, we conclude that such events are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant owed a duty to her to notify Allstate of decedent’s death and to ensure that the property was properly insured … . Gatto v Allstate Indem. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 04618, Fourth Dept 6-7-19

 

You might also like
SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DISCLOSURE OF SOME OF THE INSURER’S RECORDS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING LEGAL OPINION OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT).
THE OFFICER WHO STOPPED THE CAR IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS A PASSENGER AFTER HEARING GUN SHOTS DID NOT HAVE THE REASONABLE SUSPICION NEEDED FOR THE SEIZURE OF A VEHICLE; THE SEIZED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFECT WHICH CAUSED CLAIMANT TO SLIP AND FALL WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DEFECT, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
WITH RESPECT TO THE MANNER IN WHICH WORK IS PERFORMED, A GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE STEMS FROM THE EXERCISE OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY; INFORMING THE WORKER OF WHAT WORK SHOULD BE DONE, MONITORING THE TIME AND QUALITY OF THE WORK, ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH SAFETY REGULATIONS, AND HAVING THE AUTHORITY TO STOP WORK FOR SAFETY REASONS, DO NOT AMOUNT TO THE EXERCISE OF “SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY” (FOURTH DEPT).
JUROR MISCONDUCT, INCLUDING COMMUNICATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES AND WEB BROWSING IN VIOLATION OF THE JUDGE’S ADMONITIONS, WARRANTED A NEW TRIAL IN THIS MURDER CASE (FOURTH DEPT).
FAILURE TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS TRIGGERED NEED FOR ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION.
THE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD USED ALCOHOL TO EXCESS AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME WAS CONFLICTING AND INSUFFICIENT; IN ADDITION, THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY OR UNDER SUPERVISION AT THE TIME OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT; THEREFORE 25 POINTS WERE TAKEN OFF DEFENDANT’S RISK-LEVEL ASSESSMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY THE TRAFFIC STOP AND DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AT THE TIME DEFENDANT GOT OUT OF THE CAR; THE STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT AND THE COCAINE SEIZED FROM HIS PERSON SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE POND INTO WHICH THE 96-YEAR-OLD PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT APPARENTLY SLID... BLOCKING THE CAR IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS A PASSENGER WAS A JUSTIFIABLE LEVEL...