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CLAIMANT’S CONVICTION FOR THE UNLAWFUL MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHETAMINES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROOF THAT CLAIMANT PERFORMED WORK OR MADE FALSE STATEMENTS REGARDING WORK SUCH THAT CLAIMANT SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM RECEIVING BENEFITS UPON RELEASE FROM PRISON (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that claimant’s conviction for the unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine did not constitute work within the meaning of Workers’ Compensation Law 114-a. Therefore, claimant did not perform any work or make any false statements regarding work which would disqualify him from receiving benefits upon release from prison:

Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a (1) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f for the purpose of obtaining compensation . . ., or for the purpose of influencing any determination regarding any such payment, a claimant knowingly makes a false statement or representation as to a material fact, such person shall be disqualified from receiving any compensation directly attributable to such false statement or representation.” “In making such a determination, the Board is the sole arbiter of witness credibility and its determination as to whether a claimant violated Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence” … .

To be guilty of unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in the third degree, a person must possess, at the same time and location, “[t]wo or more items of laboratory equipment and two or more precursors, chemical reagents or solvents in any combination,” with the intent to use such products to unlawfully manufacture, prepare, or produce methamphetamine, or knowing that another intends to do so (Penal Law § 220.73 [1]). The elements of the crime do not require that any work be performed. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the conviction alone is insufficient to establish any work activity by claimant or that he received any type of remuneration … . Matter of Stone v Saulsbury/Federal Signal, 2019 NY Slip Op 04250, Third Dept 5-30-19

 

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