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SENTENCING COURT MUST MAKE A THRESHOLD DETERMINATION WHETHER DEFENDANT IS ELIGIBLE FOR YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS IN THIS FIRST DEGREE RAPE CASE, SENTENCE VACATED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department vacated defendant’s sentence for rape first degree and remitted the matter for a determination of defendant’s eligibility for youthful offender status:

… [A] “youth” is defined as “a person charged with a crime alleged to have been committed when he [or she] was at least [16] years old and less than [19] years old” (CPL 720.10 [1]), and an “eligible youth” is “a youth who is eligible to be found a youthful offender” (CPL 720.10 [2]). “Every youth is so eligible” (CPL 720.10 [2]) — subject to certain statutory exceptions including, as pertinent here, a conviction for “rape in the first degree . . ., except as provided in [CPL 720.10 (3)]” … . To that end, CPL 720.10 (3) provides, in relevant part, that “a youth who has been convicted of . . . rape in the first degree . . . is an eligible youth if the court determines that one or more [statutory] factors exist,” including “mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed” … . …

Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the underlying offense and, despite his conviction of rape in the first degree, he was not statutorily precluded from being found to be an eligible youth (see CPL 720.10 [3]). Where, as here, a defendant has been convicted of an enumerated sex offense … , the sentencing court, “in order to fulfill its responsibility under CPL 720.20 (1) to make a youthful offender determination for every eligible youth, . . . must make the threshold determination as to whether the defendant is an eligible youth by considering the factors set forth in CPL 720.10 (3)” … — “‘even where the defendant has failed to ask to be treated as a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to make such a request’ pursuant to a plea bargain” … . People v Robertucci, 2019 NY Slip Op 04057, Third Dept 5-23-19

 

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THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION TO WHICH DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY WAS JURISDICTIONALLY... THE TERM ‘AUTOMATIC OVERRIDE’ DOES NOT MANDATE THAT AN OFFENDER...