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DEFENDANT-SELLERS NOT LIABLE FOR MOLD AND MICE IN HOUSE SOLD TO PLAINTIFFS, UNDER THE MERGER DOCTRINE NO PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT SURVIVED THE DELIVERY OF THE DEED, THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR APPLIED, NO DUTY OF CARE OWED TO THE PLAINTIFFS OVER AND ABOVE THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS, THE PRIVITY ELEMENT OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION WAS ABSENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendant-sellers were not liable under breach of contract or negligence theories for the presence of mold and mice in a house sold to plaintiffs:

The contract of sale contained language providing that, unless expressly stated, no covenant, warranty, or representation in the contract survived closing. A rider to the contract stated that the defendants were not aware of any mold or vermin infestation in the house. Prior to the closing, the plaintiffs conducted a home inspection which revealed, among other things, the presence of water staining and evidence of water infiltration on the interior of the house. The home inspection report stated that a mold evaluation was beyond the scope of the inspection and recommended that if the plaintiffs were concerned about potential mold issues, they should call a professional mold abatement company to perform an inspection. The report also stated that the need for some periodic general pest control should be anticipated. The plaintiffs did not undertake a mold inspection. * * *

… [O]nce title to the property closed and the deed was delivered, “any claims the plaintiff[s] might have had arising from the contract of sale were extinguished by the doctrine of merger” since there was no “clear intent evidenced by the parties that [the relevant] provision of the contract of sale [would] survive the delivery of the deed”. … Furthermore, “New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no duty on the seller or the seller’s agent to disclose any information concerning the premises when the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller or the seller’s agent which constitutes active concealment” … . …

A simple breach of contract is not to be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been violated … . …

“A claim for negligent misrepresentation requires the plaintiff[s] to demonstrate (1) the existence of a special or privity-like relationship imposing a duty on the defendant[s] to impart correct information to the plaintiff[s]; (2) that the information was incorrect; and (3) reasonable reliance on the information” … . Here, the defendants demonstrated that there was no special or privity-like relationship between themselves and the plaintiffs in this arm’s length transaction … . Rosner v Bankers Std. Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 04015, Second Dept 5-22-19

 

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