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STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WHEN HE WAS HANDCUFFED IN THE BACK SEAT OF A POLICE CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, TANGIBLE EVIDENCE RETRIEVED AS A RESULT OF THE STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED AS WELL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant’s statements, made when he was handcuffed in the back seat of a police car, should have been suppressed. Defendant had possession of a wallet and had demanded money from the owner of the wallet in exchange for its return. The owner of the wallet went to the police. The police spoke to the defendant on the phone, and he again demanded money for the wallet. The defendant again demanded money for the wallet when the police went to his house. The wallet was retrieved after defendant made the statements in the police car, so the wallet should have been suppressed as well:

Not only was the defendant handcuffed in the back seat of a police vehicle, the detectives testified that the defendant was bargaining with them for his freedom by offering to get the wallet if they would remove the handcuffs and release him. Detective Bookstein specifically testified that the defendant was not free to leave the police vehicle. The record also demonstrates that the statements that the defendant made to the detectives during their conversation with him about the wallet were the result of the functional equivalent of interrogation and should have been suppressed … . People v Torres. 2019 NY Slip Op 03380, Second Dept 5-1-19

 

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