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ALTHOUGH THE PRIVATE CITIZEN WAS ACTING AS AN AGENT FOR THE POLICE WHEN SHE RECORDED DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION TO MURDER, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A 710.30 NOTICE BECAUSE THE STATEMENT WAS VOLUNTARILY MADE AND NOT SUBJECT TO SUPPRESSION, TWO -JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the failure to provide a CPL 710.30 notice of a statement made by defendant to a private citizen was a mere irregularity, not reversible error, because the statement was not involuntarily made, and therefore was not subject to suppression. The two dissenters argued that it was possible the defendant was induced to make the statement by the promise of sexual relations with the private citizen. Because there was a colorable basis for suppression, the dissenters argued, the defendant was entitled to notice and a hearing. In the recorded statement the defendant admitted to committing murder and explained the details. The decision is extensive and addresses several other substantive issues: (1) Defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings because he was not subjected to custodial interrogation in that he was incarcerated on another matter when he was questioned and no added constraints were imposed; (2) The prosecutor provided race-neutral explanations for challenges to jurors—one juror’s father and brother had criminal convictions—another juror acknowledged reading books by a writer with anti-police and anti-establishment views; (3) The testimony by a medical examiner who did not conduct the autopsy did not violate defendant’s right of confrontation; and (4) The defendant’s request for an accomplice jury instruction was properly denied because there was no question whether the witness participated in the offense. With respect to the statement recorded by a private citizen for which no 710.30 notice was provided, the court wrote:

… [W]e agree with our dissenting colleagues that the citizen in this case was acting as a police agent at the time she recorded the statements inasmuch as she was acting “at the instigation of the police . . . to further a police objective” … .

We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleagues, however, on the issue whether the failure to provide the CPL 710.30 notice warrants preclusion of those statements. We conclude that it does not. Where, as here, there is “no colorable basis for suppression of the statement, the failure to give notice [constitutes] a mere irregularity not warranting preclusion” … . In our view, there is no colorable basis for suppression of defendant’s statements to the private citizen. There is no dispute that defendant voluntarily went to the citizen’s home and that he was interested in pursuing a romantic relationship with her. During the entire conversation, wherein defendant admitted committing the homicide, the private citizen made no explicit or implicit promises that she would engage in sexual relations with defendant. Rather, it was defendant who offered to tell her anything she wanted to know after she expressed that she was afraid of him, and then provided her with all of the details concerning the homicide. We thus conclude that the private citizen did not make any statement or engage in any conduct that “create[d] a substantial risk that . . . defendant might falsely incriminate himself”… . ​People v Albert, 2019 NY Slip Op 03227, Fourth Dept 4-26-19

 

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DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR PREDATORY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A CHILD AND... FOR CAUSE JUROR CHALLENGES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, JURORS COULD NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY...