You are here: / / ALTHOUGH CLAIMANT WAS INJURED WHEN METAL POLES BEING HOISTED BY A CRANE...
,

ALTHOUGH CLAIMANT WAS INJURED WHEN METAL POLES BEING HOISTED BY A CRANE SLIPPED OUT OF A CHOKER AND STRUCK HIM, CLAIMANT DID NOT SUBMIT EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE RE: THE CAUSE AND DID NOT ELIMINATE QUESTIONS OF FACT RE: WHETHER HIS CONDUCT IN SECURING THE POLES WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, CLAIMANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined claimant was not entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Claimant had secured metal posts with a choker. When the posts were lifted by a crane, they slipped out of the choker and struck claimant, cause traumatic brain injury. Claimant did not submit any expert opinion evidence. Defendant alleged claimant’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident:

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a Labor Law § 240(1) “falling object” case, the claimant must demonstrate that, at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking …. Labor Law § 240(1) “does not automatically apply simply because an object fell and injured a worker; [a] plaintiff must show that the object fell . . . because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute'” … .

Here, the claimants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence submitted by the claimants was insufficient to establish that the posts fell due to the absence or inadequacy of an enumerated safety device, and the claimants further failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the claimant’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . Houston v State of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 03032, Second Dept 4-24-19

 

You might also like
SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNKECHAUG INDIAN NATION TO EXCLUDE A MEMBER OF THE NATION FROM A PARCEL OF NATION LAND (SECOND DEPT).
THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MEET THE 90-DAY-NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF RPAPL 1304 BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HAD MOVED FROM THE RESIDENCE; HOWEVER THE BANK WAS STILL REQUIRED BY RPAPL 1304 TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF THE FORECLOSURE TO THE DEFENDANT; THE PROOF THAT NOTICE WAS MAILED WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).
THE PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED DEFECT IN THE STOVE IN PLAINTIFF’S APARTMENT AND DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSPECT THE STOVE AFTER THEY INSTALLED IT; THE PROPERTY OWNERS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION STEMMING FROM A STOVE TOP FIRE (SECOND DEPT).
THE GRANTOR WAS NOT THE SOLE HEIR OF THE TITLE HOLDER; THEREFORE THE DEED PURPORTING TO TRANSFER A 100% INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY WAS VOID AB INITIO (SECOND DEPT).
Second Foreclosure Action Not Prohibited Where First Is Not Pending and Did Not Result in a Judgment
Supreme Court Does Not Have the Power to Dismiss a Complaint for Delay in Prosecution Absent 90-Notice (CPLR 3216)
LESSEE AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN SIDEWALK; DEFECT WAS NOT IN THE CURB CUT OR PEDESTRIAN RAMP FOR WHICH THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE.
YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION PROPERLY USED TO DETERMINE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) RISK LEVEL.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

COUNTY NOT LIABLE IN THIS INMATE-ON-INMATE THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE (SECOND... OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORDS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SLANTED FLOOR OF...