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DISCLAIMER IN THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE CONTRACT PRECLUDED ACTIONS BASED IN FRAUD ALLEGING THE CONCEALMENT OF A RECURRING MOLD-CAUSING CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the causes of action alleging fraud in the concealment of a recurring mold-causing condition should have been dismissed. The real estate contract included a disclaimer which stated that plaintiffs relied upon their own inspection of the property and not any representations made by others:

“In an action to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiff must prove a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury” … . In the context of real estate transactions, “New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no duty on the seller or the seller’s agent to disclose any information concerning the premises when the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller or the seller’s agent which constitutes active concealment” … . “If however, some conduct (i.e., more than mere silence) on the part of the seller rises to the level of active concealment, a seller may have a duty to disclose information concerning the property” … . “To maintain a cause of action to recover damages for active concealment, the plaintiff must show, in effect, that the seller or the seller’s agents thwarted the plaintiff’s efforts to fulfill his [or her] responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor” … .

The presence of disclaimers in a written agreement may preclude a claim of common-law fraud by rendering any resulting reliance unjustified … . Moreover, a specific disclaimer of reliance on representations as to the condition of real property will generally bar related fraud-based claims … . Here, the contract of sale for the subject premises set forth,  a… lia, that the plaintiffs were “fully aware of the physical condition and state of repair of the Premises . . . based on [their] own inspection and investigation thereof,” and that they were “entering into this contract based solely upon such inspection and investigation and not upon any information . . . or representations . . . given or made by Seller or its representatives.” Comora v Franklin, 2019 NY Slip Op 02671, Second Dept 4-10-19

 

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PURSUANT TO AN EXCEPTION IN 22 NYCRR 202.5-b, USING THE NYSCEF ELECTRONIC FILING... JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE...