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RELEVANT REGULATION, RATHER THAN THE POLICY LANGUAGE, CONTROLLED THE CALCULATION OF INTEREST ON INSURANCE POLICY PROCEEDS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the relevant regulation, as opposed to the less generous insurance policy provision, controlled the payment of interest on policy proceeds:

Defendant[‘s] … insurer’s bare offer to pay the policy limit was not a “tender” of the policy for the purposes of stopping the accrual of prejudgment interest under 11 NYCRR 60-1.1(b). While the policy provides that the insurer will pay interest on a judgment until “we have paid, offered to pay or deposited in court the part of the judgment that is within our Limit of Insurance,” 11 NYCRR 60-1.1(b) requires the insurer to pay postjudgment interest until it has “paid or tendered or deposited in court” the part of the judgment that does not exceed the policy limit. As the policy language is less generous to the insured than the regulation, it is deemed superseded by the regulation … . Within that framework, a bare offer to pay does not constitute a tender. Thus, interest must be calculated from the date of entry of the order that granted summary judgment to plaintiff until the date of payment … . Gyabaah v Rivlab Transp. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 02417, First Dept 3-28-19

 

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