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THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT THE ALLEGEDLY DISABLED PERSON WAS NOT COMPETENT IN 2015 WHEN THE SHORT FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY WAS EXECUTED, THEREFORE THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO CREATE A SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUST FOR THE ALLEGEDLY DISABLED PERSON (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the short form power of attorney executed in 2015 by Delaney, an allegedly disabled person, was valid and allowed the attorney-in-fact, Pacchiana, to set up a supplemental needs trust for Delaney:

To be valid, a statutory short form power of attorney must “[b]e signed and dated by a principal with capacity, with the signature of the principal duly acknowledged in the manner prescribed for the acknowledgment of a conveyance of real property” (General Obligations Law § 5-1501B[1][b] … ). “Capacity” is defined as the “ability to comprehend the nature and consequences of the act of executing and granting, revoking, amending or modifying a power of attorney, any provision in a power of attorney, or the authority of any person to act as agent under a power of attorney” (General Obligations Law § 5-1501[2][c]). “A party’s competence to enter into a transaction is presumed, even if the party suffers from a condition affecting cognitive function, and the party asserting incapacity bears the burden of proof'” … . “The incapacity must be shown to exist at the time the pertinent document was executed” … . Such incapacity was not shown here … .

Pacchiana, as Delaney’s attorney-in-fact, had the authority to commence a proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court for the creation of a supplemental trust in Delaney’s behalf (see General Obligations Law § 5-1502H …). Matter of Delaney, 2019 NY Slip Op 02090, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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