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FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED OR FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action should not have been dismissed as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) or for neglect to prosecute pursuant to CPLR 3216:

It is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a default judgment within one year of the default in order to avoid dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) … . Rather, it is enough that the plaintiff timely takes the preliminary step toward obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale by moving for an order of reference to establish that it initiated proceedings for entry of a judgment within one year of the default for the purposes of satisfying CPLR 3215(c) … . Within one year after the defendant’s default, the plaintiff took the preliminary step toward obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale by moving for an order of reference (see RPAPL 1321[1]) and, thus, did not abandon this action … . …

Furthermore, the Supreme Court was without power to direct dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 on the ground of lack of prosecution. While CPLR 3216 authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for neglect to prosecute, joinder of issue and service of a 90-day notice are conditions precedent to a dismissal under that statute  … . Here, dismissal was improper, as issue was never joined in the action … . US Bank, N.A. v Picone, 2019 NY Slip Op 02141, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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