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THE SOLE REMEDY PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT IN THIS RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES CASE, WHICH REQUIRED THAT THE DEFENDANT BE NOTIFIED AND GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO REPURCHASE DEFECTIVE MORTGAGES, WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH PRIOR TO THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, PLAINTIFF’S TIMELY COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, DESPITE THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SOLE REMEDY PROVISION, ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO REFILE THE COMPLAINT WITHIN SIX MONTHS PURSUANT TO CPLR 205 (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined that the trustee’s breach of contract action in the residential-mortgage-backed-securities (RMBS) case was properly dismissed without prejudice, allowing plaintiff to refile pursuant to CPLR 205 (which allows a suit to be refiled within six months of a dismissal that is not on the merits). The contractual sole remedy provision, which requires that the defendant (DLJ) be notified and given the opportunity to repurchase any mortgages deemed defective, was not be complied with and the timely complaint was dismissed for that reason:

As a general rule, under CPLR 205 (a) a subsequent action may be filed within six months of a non-merits dismissal of the initial timely-filed matter. Here, we conclude that CPLR 205 (a) applies to an RMBS trustee’s second action when its timely first action is dismissed for failure to comply with a contractual condition precedent. * * *

The difference between a procedural and substantive condition precedent is well-established. A condition precedent is substantive when it “describe[s] acts or events which must occur before a party is obliged to perform a promise made pursuant to an existing contract”… . In other words, the condition is “part of the cause of action and necessary to be alleged and proven, and without this no cause of action exist[s]” … , RMBS notice and sole remedy provisions are not substantive elements of the cause of action, but instead limitations on the remedy for a breach of the mortgage loan representations and warranties … . They serve as a precondition, “a procedural prerequisite to suit,” not a separate undertaking by the trustee … . Since notice and sole remedy provisions “do[] not create a substantive condition precedent” … , they do not affect when the statute of limitations commences because the limitations clock begins to run when the contract is executed.

Nevertheless, DLJ argues that the Trustee had to fulfill the procedural condition precedent before the limitations period expired, and its failure to do so rendered the original action untimely, such that a new action cannot be commenced pursuant to CPLR 205 (a). DLJ’s argument cannot be reconciled with our case law that a suit may be refiled pursuant to CPLR 205 (a) despite a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a condition precedent prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 01169, CtApp 2-19-19

 

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