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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT TOLL WHILE DEFENDANT WAS OUT OF STATE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT COULD HAVE BEEN SERVED OUT OF STATE, PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the statute of limitations did not toll while defendant was out of state and the action was therefore time-barred:

The plaintiffs’ contention that the action was timely because they were entitled to the benefit of the tolling provision of CPLR 207 based on the defendant’s alleged absence from the state did not raise a question of fact. Under that statute, as relevant here, when a defendant leaves the state after an action has accrued, and is continually absent from the state for at least four months, the time of the defendant’s absence is not included in the time during which the action must be commenced. This tolling provision, however, does not apply “while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be obtained without personal delivery of the summons to the defendant within the state” (CPLR 207[3] …). In other words, the toll will not apply if there is a means by which the defendant may be served notwithstanding his or her absence from the state … . Here, even during his alleged absence from New York State, the defendant was subject to service of process (see CPLR 302[a][2]; 308[5]; 313 …). The plaintiffs did not submit evidence establishing that the defendant was attempting to evade service of process by, for example, living secretly in a foreign country, such that no means of service of process on him was available … . MP v Davidsohn, 2019 NY Slip Op 01069, Second Dept 2-13-19

 

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