You are here: / / INJURY FROM A FALLING BLOCK AND CHAIN USED TO REPLACE A ROLL UP DOOR WAS...

INJURY FROM A FALLING BLOCK AND CHAIN USED TO REPLACE A ROLL UP DOOR WAS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) BUT NOT UNDER LABOR LAW 241 (6) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action, but defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action. “The plaintiff allege[d] that he was injured … when a differential block and chain fell onto his head as he and his coworkers were preparing a hoisting apparatus to remove and replace a broken roll-up gate on the defendants’ premises:”

” [T]he statutory requirement that workers be provided with proper protection extends not only to the hazards of building materials falling,’ but to the hazards of defective parts of safety devices falling from an elevated level to the ground'” … . Here, the defendants are liable whether the plaintiff’s coworker accidently dropped the differential while preparing to use the hoisting apparatus to remove the old roll-up gate, or the differential fell because it was inadequately secured … . …

However, unlike Labor Law § 240, which includes repair work, Labor Law § 241(6) is limited to those areas in which construction, excavation, or demolition work is being performed (compare Labor Law § 240[1], with Labor Law § 241[6]). In this case, Labor Law § 241(6) is inapplicable because the plaintiff was not performing work in the context of construction, demolition, or excavation … . Barrios v 19-19 24th Ave. Co., LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 01046, Second Dept 2-13-19

 

You might also like
THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION PROPERLY DENIED PETITIONER-TEACHER’S REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF AN EXEMPTION FROM THE COVID VACCINE MANDATE BECAUSE THE MANDATE IS NO LONGER IN EFFECT; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED AN ADVISORY OPINION TO THE CONTRARY; THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES WAS IMPROPER; THE PETITION DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS THE GUN FOUND UNDER HIS SEAT IN THE CAR; THE PEOPLE DID NOT RELY ON THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE OCCUPANTS OF A CAR POSSESS CONTRABAND IN THE CAR; RATHER THE PEOPLE RELIED ON THE TESTIMONY OF A POLICE OFFICER WHO SAW DEFENDANT PLACE AN OBJECT UNDER HIS SEAT; AFTER DEFENDANT GOT OUT OF THE CAR, THE BARREL OF THE GUN WAS IN PLAIN VIEW (SECOND DEPT).
Taser or Stun Gun Is Not a “Dangerous Instrument” for Purposes of Burglary and Menacing Statutes; Court Must Articulate Specific Reasons for Shackling Defendant During Trial
SNOW-REMOVAL EFFORTS NOT PARTICULARIZED, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
THE MEANING OF ‘GROSS EARNED INCOME’ IN THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT AFFECTED THE CALCULATION OF CHILD SUPPORT; THE TERM WAS AMBIGUOUS REQUIRING A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES (SECOND DEPT).
“Serious Physical Injury” Element of Gang Assault Not Supported by Legally Sufficient Evidence
LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, TENANT WAS ASSAULTED IN THE BUILDING, ASSAULT WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT). ​
Petition Sufficiently Alleged the Town’s Restrictive Covenant Was Invalid (1) Because It Sought to Regulate the Owner of Land Rather than the Use of the Land, (2) Because It No Longer Could Accomplish Its Purpose, and (3) Because It Effected an Unconstitutional Taking of Petitioner’s Land

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE INSIDE THE BUILDING SHE WAS WORKING IN, THE... FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AN APPEALABLE ISSUE IN AN ANDERS BRIEF ARGUING THAT THERE...