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CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT (CSSA) WAS INCORRECTLY APPLIED TO INCOME ABOVE THE STATUTORY CAP (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the court did not correctly apply the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA):

… [T]he court erred in applying the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) to the combined parental income in excess of the statutory cap … . It is well settled that “blind application of the statutory formula to [combined parental income] over [the statutory cap], without any express findings or record evidence of the [child’s] actual needs, constitutes an abdication of judicial responsibility and renders meaningless the statutory provision setting a cap on strict application of the formula”… . Here, in awarding child support on income above the statutory cap, the court considered only the father’s financial situation. “[T]he court made no factual findings that the child[ ] [had] financial needs that would not be met unless child support were ordered to be paid out of parental income in excess of [the statutory cap],” and we conclude that, “even if the court had made such a finding, there is no evidence in the record to support it” … . Therefore, in the exercise of our discretion, we fix the father’s basic child support obligation on the basis of the combined parental CSSA income up to the cap amount … . Benedict v Benedict, 2019 NY Slip Op 01042, Fourth Dept 2-8-19

 

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