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ALTHOUGH THE CITY OWED A SPECIAL DUTY TO A STUDENT WHO WAS STRUCK BY A CAR ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE ROAD, THAT DUTY WAS FULFILLED WHEN THE CROSSING GUARD TOLD THE STUDENT TO WALK TO THE NEXT AVAILABLE CROSSWALK, THE STUDENT, HOWEVER, THEN ATTEMPTED TO CROSS WHERE THERE WAS NO CROSSWALK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the city’s motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case involving a student who had just left school was properly granted. The city owed a special duty to the student-plaintiff. A school crossing guard had stopped the plaintiff from crossing the street where there was no crosswalk and told her to walk to the next crosswalk. The plaintiff, however, attempted to cross where there was no crosswalk and was hit by a car. Any alleged negligent supervision was not the proximate cause of the student’s injury:

… [A] special duty existed between the City defendants’ crossing guard and the infant plaintiff … . Nevertheless, given that the crossing guard, inter alia, told the infant plaintiff to not cross 7th Avenue at an unsafe location and pointed the infant plaintiff to the crosswalk at 19th Street, the City defendants established, prima facie, that its employees did not breach their duty to the infant plaintiff. Moreover, the City defendants, while under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge, are not insurers of their safety … . The evidence submitted by the City defendants established, prima facie, that the infant plaintiff crossed 7th Avenue in the middle of the block where there was no intersection or crosswalk, and no traffic device affording her a right-of-way. Additionally, the infant plaintiff admitted that she attempted to cross the road “fast,” and that she did not look for oncoming traffic. Where an accident occurs so quickly that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, any lack of supervision is not a proximate cause of the injury … . K.A. v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 00861, Second Dept 2-6-19

 

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