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REMOVING ICE AND SNOW FROM THE ROOF OF A COMMERCIAL BUILDING IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), IT DOESN’T MATTER WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED FROM THE FALL FROM THE BUCKET OF THE BACKHOE OR FROM BEING STRUCK BY THE BACKHOE (WHICH WAS BEING USED TO LIFT PLAINTIFF TO THE ROOF), PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action was properly granted. Plaintiff fell from the bucket of a backhoe which was being used to lift him to the roof, where he was to remove snow and ice:

Labor Law § 240 (1) “applies where an employee is engaged in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure’ ” … . We conclude that, contrary to defendant’s contention, the removal of snow and ice from the roof of a commercial building, under these circumstances, constitutes a form of “cleaning,” thereby bringing it within the ambit of Labor Law § 240 (1) … .

We reject defendant’s contention that plaintiff was not injured by an elevation-related risk within the scope of Labor Law § 240 (1). Plaintiff established the necessary elements for liability under section 240 (1) by submitting evidence that he suffered “harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person”… , and defendant did not raise a question of material fact… .

… [P]aintiff is entitled to summary judgment irrespective of whether his injuries were caused by the fall itself or by being struck by the backhoe in the moments immediately following the fall. “To establish a prima facie case plaintiff need not demonstrate that the precise manner in which the accident happened or the injuries occurred was foreseeable; it is sufficient that he demonstrate that the risk of some injury from defendants’ conduct was foreseeable” … . “Thus, a plaintiff merely has to demonstrate that he or she was injured when an elevation-related safety device failed to perform its function to support and secure him from injury”… . Here, the safety equipment provided to plaintiff did not prevent him from falling; thus, the core objective of Labor Law § 240 (1) was not met … . Plaintiff’s injury was a normal and foreseeable consequence of the failure of the safety equipment … . Burns v Marcellus Lanes, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 00801, Fourth Dept 2-1-19

 

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