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PLAINTIFF FELL ABOUT NINE FEET FROM ONE FLOOR TO ANOTHER, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff fell from one floor to another, a distance of about nine feet:

There is no dispute that plaintiff fell from the seventh floor to the sixth floor of the building on which he was working, a distance of approximately nine feet. Further, it is undisputed that there were no safety harnesses or other safety devices for plaintiff to use. “Thus, the fact that the parties offered different versions of plaintiff’s accident makes no difference with respect to defendants’ liability under Labor Law § 240(1). Under either version, defendants . . . failed to secure an area at a construction site from which a fall could occur, thereby exposing the injured worker to an elevation-related risk” … .

However, the motion court properly denied the cross motion of defendants/third-party plaintiffs on the Labor Law §§ 241(6), 200, and common-law negligence claims, since there are triable issues of fact as to exactly how, where and why the underlying incident occurred … . Cashbamba v 1056 Bedford LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 00690, Second Dept 1-31-19

 

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PLAINTIFF’S HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN... STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE PAINT CONTAINED LEAD DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THERE...