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UNWARNED STATEMENTS MADE DURING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AND STATEMENTS MADE IN THE ABSENCE OF COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, SOME UNPRESERVED APPELLATE ISSUES CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a partial dissent, reversed defendant’s bribery and falsely reporting an incident convictions, in the interest of justice, and ordered a new trial. The facts are too complex to fairly summarize here. Defendant was accused of assault by her husband. The police called her to the station where she was interviewed. After she was told she would be placed under arrest she allegedly offered sex and money to the interviewing officer (Officer Persaud) to make the charges go away. The officer wore a wire to record further conversations about the bribery. After defendant was arraigned and represented by counsel, defendant was again interviewed in the back of a police car (by Sargeant Klein and her partner) concerning the alleged bribery. That conversation was also recorded. Statements made during custodial interrogation that were not preceded by Miranda warnings and statements made to police officers in the absence of counsel should not have been admitted. Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object:

Officer Persaud should have known that in telling the defendant that she needed to come to the precinct station house in connection with his investigation into the allegations her husband had made against her, allegations about which she had already been told she would be arrested, placing her in an interview room, and then confronting her with the allegations and the evidence against her, including the existence of the order of protection, he was reasonably likely to elicit from the defendant an incriminating response … . * * *

… [T]the defendant’s alleged bribery of Officer Persaud and her allegedly false reporting of his sexual misconduct during that same encounter were “so inextricably interwoven in terms of both their temporal proximity and factual interrelationship” as to render unavoidable the conclusion that any interrogation concerning the allegedly false report would inevitably elicit incriminating responses regarding the matter in which there had been an entry of counsel… . Furthermore, the police were aware that the defendant was actually represented by an attorney and the interrogation actually entailed an infringement of her constitutional right to counsel by impermissible questioning on the represented crimes … . * * *

… [T]he defendant demonstrated the absence of “a reasonable and legitimate strategy under the circumstances and evidence presented” … for defense counsel’s stipulation to admission of a recording of the entire interview between the defendant and Sergeant Klein and her partner, and his failure to object to Sergeant Klein’s testimony recounting the same interview, or Officer Persaud’s testimony in which he recounted numerous statements made by the defendant, of which the People failed to provide notice as required by CPL 710.30(1)(a). People v Stephans, 2019 NY Slip Op 00473, Second Dept 1-23-19

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, RIGHT TO COUNSEL

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