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TIME LIMITS ON ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR A PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY INCLUDED IN WCL 15 (3) (w) APPLY TO THE CALCULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS IN WCL 15 (3) (v) (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a dissenting opinion, determined the durational limits for compensation pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) 15 (3) (w) (paragraph w) are incorporated into WCL 15 (3) (v) (paragraph v). Therefore the claimant was entitled to compensation for permanent partial disability (50 % loss of use of his left arm) only for the 275 weeks allowed by paragraph w:

… [N]othing in the language of paragraph v regarding termination of additional compensation upon eligibility for age-based social security benefits contradicts paragraph w’s durational restrictions or precludes their application to paragraph v recipients. By incorporating the entirety of paragraph w’s framework for calculating benefits, paragraph v provides additional compensation lasting a maximum number of weeks as a supplement to the schedule award the worker already received. Paragraph v’s requirement that such payment terminates if the worker becomes eligible for age-based social security payments (regardless of how many weeks have passed) merely places another limit, where applicable, on the additional compensation a claimant can receive. …

… [N]either of the primary benefits that section 15(3) provides are open-ended. Both schedule loss of use awards and non-schedule benefits continue for a maximum number of weeks, depending on the nature or severity of the worker’s disability. Interpreting paragraph v to grant a subset of recipients open-ended benefits limited only by eligibility for age-based social security payments — an award that would potentially span their working lifetimes — would uniquely benefit that small group above all other permanent partial disability award recipients. There is no textual support for such an exceptional interpretation. Rather, under the plain language of paragraph v, additional compensation awards are calculated pursuant to the formula and durational provisions of paragraph w, terminating earlier if or when a claimant becomes eligible for age-based social security benefits. Matter of Mancini v Office of Children & Family Servs., 2018 NY Slip Op 08425, CtApp 12-11-18

 

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