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THE REAR-END CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN PENNSYLVANIA BUT ALL PARTIES RESIDED IN NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED THAT PENNSYLVANIA LAW APPLIED, BECAUSE THE PARTIES DID NOT RAISE THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE THEY ARE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE APPLICABILITY OF NEW YORK LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Ibrahims, the driver and owner of the second car in a four-car chain-reaction rear-end accident, were entitled to summary judgment. The accident occurred in Pennsylvania but all parties were residents of New York. Supreme Court, sua sponte, held that Pennsylvania law applied and the Ibrahims summary judgment motion must be denied under Pennsylvania law. The Second Department noted that none of the parties raised the choice of law issue and therefore the parties must be deemed to have consented to the applicability of New York law:

The Supreme Court should not have raised the issue of Pennsylvania law of its own accord, and should not have based its determination of the motion on a ground that was neither raised nor briefed by the parties … . “Parties to a civil litigation, in the absence of a strong countervailing public policy, may consent, formally or by their conduct, to the law to be applied” … . By failing to raise a choice of law issue in opposition to Ibrahim’s motion for summary judgment, the codefendants are deemed to have consented to the application of New York law… .

In this case, Ibrahim established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that he brought his vehicle safely to a stop behind the lead vehicle before being struck in the rear by the Goldman vehicle … . Abdou v Malone, 2018 NY Slip Op 08106, Second Dept 11-28-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, THE REAR-END CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN PENNSYLVANIA BUT ALL PARTIES RESIDED IN NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED THAT PENNSYLVANIA LAW APPLIED, BECAUSE THE PARTIES DID NOT RAISE THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE THEY ARE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE APPLICABILITY OF NEW YORK LAW (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CHOICE OF LAW, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, THE REAR-END CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN PENNSYLVANIA BUT ALL PARTIES RESIDED IN NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED THAT PENNSYLVANIA LAW APPLIED, BECAUSE THE PARTIES DID NOT RAISE THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE THEY ARE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE APPLICABILITY OF NEW YORK LAW (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGES (SUA SPONTE, (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, THE REAR-END CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN PENNSYLVANIA BUT ALL PARTIES RESIDED IN NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED THAT PENNSYLVANIA LAW APPLIED, BECAUSE THE PARTIES DID NOT RAISE THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE THEY ARE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE APPLICABILITY OF NEW YORK LAW (SECOND DEPT))/SUA SPONTE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, THE REAR-END CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN PENNSYLVANIA BUT ALL PARTIES RESIDED IN NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED THAT PENNSYLVANIA LAW APPLIED, BECAUSE THE PARTIES DID NOT RAISE THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE THEY ARE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE APPLICABILITY OF NEW YORK LAW (SECOND DEPT))/CHOICE OF LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, THE REAR-END CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN PENNSYLVANIA BUT ALL PARTIES RESIDED IN NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED THAT PENNSYLVANIA LAW APPLIED, BECAUSE THE PARTIES DID NOT RAISE THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE THEY ARE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE APPLICABILITY OF NEW YORK LAW (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (THE REAR-END CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN PENNSYLVANIA BUT ALL PARTIES RESIDED IN NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED THAT PENNSYLVANIA LAW APPLIED, BECAUSE THE PARTIES DID NOT RAISE THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE THEY ARE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE APPLICABILITY OF NEW YORK LAW (SECOND DEPT))/REAR END COLLISIONS (HE REAR-END CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN PENNSYLVANIA BUT ALL PARTIES RESIDED IN NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED THAT PENNSYLVANIA LAW APPLIED, BECAUSE THE PARTIES DID NOT RAISE THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE THEY ARE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE APPLICABILITY OF NEW YORK LAW (SECOND DEPT))

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